Considered here are equilibria, notably those that solve noncooperative games. Focus is on connections between evolutionary stability, concavity and monotonicity. It is shown that evolutionary stable points are local attractors under gradient dynamics. Such dynamics, while reflecting search for individual improvement, can incorporate myopia, imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality/competence.
Introduction
This paper has two main objects: first, to relate a crucial condition called evolutionary stability to general equilibrium problems; second, to illustrate how such stability, when coupled with gradient methods, may help in locating equilibria. A subsidiary purpose is to emphasize some important links between theories of optimization and strategic behavior.
Motivation for this endeavor stems from recurrent problems in noncooperative games. Unlike convex programs such games often yield disconnected solution sets, typically composed of isolated singletons. When this happens, one might like to justify, predict or select a single Nash equilibrium among several. That problem has attracted much interest and spurred many studies. A main line of inquiry looks at persistence or emergence of equilibrium under perturbations. The leading idea there is that a solution becomes more plausible, comprehensible or refined if it filters through stability tests; see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or van Damme (1991) . Another, maybe more fruitful direction of investigation seeks equilibrium as the asymptotic limit, if any, of repeated play among agents who iteratively adapt to new experience; consult e.g. Ermoliev and Uryasiev (1982) , Flåm (1999) , Robinson (1951) , or Rosen (1965) .
Evolutionary game theory -presented in Samuelson (1997) , Vega-Redondo (1996), Weibull (1996) and pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) , (1982) -stands out in accommodating features from both these strands. 1 On one side, the prime concept of an evolutionary stable (ES) strategy puts focus on particularly robust Nash equilibria. Loosely speaking, an ES strategy withstands moderate pressure from mutation and selection. On the other side, in symmetric two-person cases such a strategy becomes asymptotically stable under so-called replicator dynamic; see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) . So, the notion ES speaks for itself on two complementary grounds: Not only will such outcomes be robust; they will also enjoy good stability properties under an important sort of dynamic.
However, that dynamic, when Darwinian in nature, fits biology better than economics. While biological agents are "hard-wired" to behave in certain ways, economic agents deliberate their choices and act intentionally. While nature selects strategists the latter choose strategies. Economic or social dynamic should therefore reflect not only growth or survival, but rationality or learning as well. Candidate dynamics include mean-value iterates , fictitious vor-Spiel (Robinson 1951) , and adaptive play (Young 1998 ). Common to them, however, is the dominant role assigned to best responses, an assignment that hardly can achieve universal acceptance. Some natural reserves emerge because global optimization typically requires much competence and energy. Moreover, such behavior often induces nonsmoothness or instability in how play unfolds. To mitigate these features -and to accommodate more human-like, pragmatic players -we shall assume instead that everybody, at every stage, merely seeks to better himself -and does so in fairly myopic, local manner. But then: Will repeated play lead to Nash equilibrium? And if so, to what sort of equilibrium?
To come to grips with these issues Section 2 recalls and generalizes the key notion ES. Section 3 lends that notion some legitimacy by showing that any ES point will be asymptotically stable under gradient dynamic. This novel finding appears useful because such dynamic not only fits deliberate self-improvement; it can also accommodate bounded rationality and limited knowledge. Section 4 offers some examples.
Evolutionary Stability
The subsequent study will be organized around a generalized notion of evolutionary stability: Definition 1. (Evolutionary stability) Let X be a nonempty closed convex subset of some real Euclidean space E, and let π : X × X → R be continuous. We declarex ∈ X evolutionary stable, ES for short, (with respect to this π) if for all x 6 =x in some vicinity V ⊆ X ofx, the function π(·, x) is locally concave at x: g ∈ ∂π(·, x)(x) ⇒ π(x, x) + hx − x, gi ≥ π(x, x)and superior (strictly maximal) atx: π(x, x) > π(x, x).
All together (1) says that
whenever x ∈ X is distinct from but sufficiently nearx; see Fig. 1 . Throughout h·, ·i denotes an inner product on the space E with associated norm kxk := hx, xi 1 2 . The vector g ∈ ∂π(·, x)(x) is a partial, generalized gradient 2 of π(·, ·), taken with respect to the first variable and evaluated at the diagonal pair (x, x). Note that π satisfies (1) iff for any numbers α > 0, β the affine transformation απ + β does the same. Moreover, if π andπ both satisfy (1) for the samex, then so does π +π.
To avoid repeated statements and qualifications, any symbol X or X i refers henceforth to a nonempty closed, possibly unbounded convex subset of some Euclidean space, and V always denotes an X-neighborhood of an ESx ∈ X; that is, {x : kx −xk ≤ r} ∩ X ⊆ V ⊆ X for some positive r. (X is thus endowed with the relative topology induced by the ambient space.)
In essence (1) spells out properties that π(·, x) should satisfy in its first variable, the pointx there being distinguished. The strict inequality in (1) may be interpreted as follows: Construe the "second variable" x as a system state that parametrizes a "univariate" payoff function π(·, x). Then, if viewed from any prevailing state x 6 =x, close enough tox, the "choice"x is strictly preferred to the status quo. Moreover, the somewhat myopic, linear prediction hx − x, gi of the resulting gain π(x, x) − π(x, x) is always a positive over-estimate.
Bomze and Pötscher (1989) study instances where π is linear in the first variable. (See Examples 8 and 9 below.) The first property in (1) then comes for free and assumes a global character. Moreover, when π(·, x) = h·, n(x)i , the second property in (1) says that hx −x, n(x)i < 0 for all x ∈ V \x. This inequality points towards an interior/strict version of the normal cone N(x) := {n : hx −x, ni ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ X} that "stretches out" of X atx. Bomze and Pötscher (op. cit.) explore this relation. They deal with cases where X is a collection of probability measures on some (sigma-field of an) underlying space of strategies.
Our main motivation for considering (1) stems from noncooperative, normal-form games, involving a finite set I of players. Individual i ∈ I then chooses, with-out collaboration, a strategy x i ∈ X i to maximize his supposedly continuous payoff π i (x i , x −i ), the profile x −i := (x j ) j6 =i being short notation for the actions of i's rivals. Let then X := Π i∈I X i and define π : X × X → R by
this implying π(x, x) = 0. Note thatx ∈ X will be a Nash equilibrium iff it is an extremal fixed point, namely:x ∈ arg max {π(x,x) : x ∈ X} -or equivalently, iff it satisfies the variational inequality
Also note that for instance (2) the first inequality in (1) holds provided every payoff function π i (x i , x −i ) be concave and generalized differentiable in own variable x i . The strict inequality in (1) is admittedly somewhat demanding. Example 4 below elaborates on its relevance for games. Instead of (1) the reader might be familiar with the following alternative notion: A pointx ∈ X is declared an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) -in the sense of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) 
Here x ε := (1 − ε)x + εx is a mixed state, and (4) says that the "incumbent"x fares better against the modified ("contaminated") situation x ε than does the "mutant" x. Proposition 1. Suppose π is locally superior atx and that
for any positive ε ≤ some positive threshold ε(x). Then the ESS condition (4) holds.
Proof. Pick any x ∈ X \x and a positive ε ≤ ε(x) so small that x ε = (1−ε)x+εx ∈ V and (5) holds. Then
whence (4) follows. 2 The concavity assumptions in Definition 1 and Proposition 1 are, of course, satisfied when π is globally concave in the first variable. For a converse of Proposition 1 suppose X is bounded. Then, given anyx ∈ X define its opposite boundary obd(x) as follows. For every x ∈ X \x there exists a unique number λ ≥ 1 at which the half-ray λx + (1 − λ)x leaves X. The set obd(x) consists of exactly these boundary points λx +(1− λ)x. Clearly, whenx is relatively interior to X, its opposite boundary coincides with all of bdX. If X is a polyhedron andx ∈ bdX, then obd(x) comprises all of bdX less the relatively open faces to whichx belongs. A convenient feature of polyhedral instances is thatx / ∈ cl(obd(x)). We say thatx ∈ X admits a uniform entry barrierε ∈ (0, 1] iff (4) holds for all x ∈ obd(x) and all positive ε ≤ε. Following Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), when π is affine in the second variable, one may prove that any ESSx admits a uniform barrier. We declare a function f : X → R strictly quasi-convex atx ∈ X iff there exists a positiveε ≤ 1 such that
Proposition 2. Let X be bounded. Suppose thatx ∈ X admits a uniform barrier and does not belong to the closure of its opposite boundary. Then if π is strictly quasi-convex with respect to the first variable atx, that point is locally superior.
Proof. Letε equal the minimum of the uniform barrier and the tresholdε of strict quasi-convexity. Sincex / ∈ cl(obd(x)), the set
becomes an X-neighborhood ofx. That is, there exists a positive radius r such that {x ∈ X : kx −xk ≤ r} ⊆ V ⊆ X. Pick any x ε = (1 − ε)x + εx ∈ V with x ∈ obd(x) and 0 < ε ≤ min(ε,ε). Then (4) holds and by the strict quasi-convexity of π(·, x ε ) at x we get the desired inequality π(x, x ε ) > π(x ε , x ε ). 2 Bomze and Pötscher (1989), while assuming π linear in the first variable, explore existence of a uniform barrier. In that casex is declared uninvadable.
Propositions 1 and 2 point to a possible equivalence between (1) and (4) provided π is suitably concave in the first variable. Clearly, the implication (4) ⇒ (3) obtains by letting ε → 0 + . But more may hold here. In fact, adding appropriate linearity, we obtain straightforwardly the classical definition that any other best response x to the incumbentx fares worse thanx against itself: Proposition 3. Suppose π is affine in the second variable. Then (4) is equivalent to π(x,x) ≥ π(x,x) for all x ∈ X, and x 6 =x, π(x,x) = π(x,x) ⇒ π(x, x) > π(x, x). 2 (6) We conclude this section by considering a special but important class of problems for which equilibria are ES: Definition 2. (Concave-convex functions) π : X × X → R is called concave in the first coordinate atx if for any x in some vicinity V ⊆ X ofx and every ε ∈ [0, 1] , it holds with
π is declared convex in the second coordinate atx if under the same hypothesis
Proposition 4. (Concave-convex problems have ES equilibria) Suppose π is constant along the diagonal and concave-convex atx in the sense of (7), (8) . Also suppose that π(x, ·) is strictly convex atx, this meaning that
for all x sufficiently near but 6 =x and anyγ ∈ ∂π(x, ·)(x). Then, under (3)x is ES.
Proof. With no loss of generality on may replace π by the translated version π(·, ·) − π(x,x). So, suppose that π(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ X. As preparation for the main argument we claim that
To demonstrate (10) pick a vicinity V ⊆ X ofx such that both (7) and (8) hold. Select any x ∈ V and let as before
The concavity property (7) tells that for everyḡ ∈ ∂π(·,x)(x) it holds that
Combining these inequalities we get π(x, x) ≥ hx −x, −ḡi ≥ π(x,x) + hx −x, −ḡi , whence −ḡ ∈ ∂π(x, ·)(x). This proves claim (10) . We come now to the main argument. By assumption (3) there exists a gradientḡ ∈ ∂π(·,x)(x) such that hx −x,ḡi ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X. Via (10) we get −ḡ ∈ ∂π(x, ·)(x). Hence by the strict local convexity (9) of π(x, ·) we have
This takes care of local superiority. The other (gradient) inequality in (1) follows from the local concavity (7) of π(·, x) over V . 2 3. Gradient or Adaptive Dynamics As said, we prefer to model dynamics that reflect rationality but requires neither global perception nor much system knowledge of any concerned party. Fitting such a philosophy is the gradient flow
its initial point x(0) ∈ X being arbitrary. For simplicity we often write x instead of x(t). The set T x := clR + (X − x) denotes the tangent cone of X at x ∈ X. The orthogonal projection (operator) onto a nonempty closed convex set C is written P C . It is also called the closest approximation in C.
(11) subscribes to Alfred Marshall's opinion that adjustments are driven by margins, emerging through linearization in the vicinity of the current state.
By a solution to the differential inclusion (11) we mean an absolutely continuous function 0 ≤ t 7 → x(t) ∈ X which satisfies (11) almost everywhere (a.e.); see Aubin and Cellina (1984) . We tacitly assume that from any x(0) ∈ X there emanates a unique solution. In that case x(t) ∈ X for all t > 0. To appreciate (11) reconsider the normal-form game that gives rise to instance (2). Then (11) splits into a system
having initial points x i (0) ∈ X i which could be arbitrary or determined by historical "accident." Equation (12) portrays each player as steadily moving along a projected direction of payoff ascent. In particular, when x i is interior to X i , and π i (·, x −i ) differentiable at x i , player i proceeds in the direction of steepest ascent. System (12) requires very little input to be kept going. Basically, it suffices that each player persistently observes his marginal payoff. Nobody must know the game, his rivals, their preferences or actions. Admittedly, players behaving as described by (12) stand to be criticized: Each seemingly believes that all his rivals will stay put. No one looks for large size improvements; nobody makes a great leap towards a best response. But criticisms of such attitudes often appears unfair though. How could a player form specific beliefs about his rivals if he never gets to observe their actions? And why should he move much or swiftly -or respond optimally -if he merely knows his own payoff function up to local, linear approximation? In spite of players knowing little or moving slowly, system (12) enjoys remarkable stability. Indeed, as showed next, equilibrium may be reached -and perpetuated, not by perfect rationality, but by reasonable responses to local incentives: Theorem 1. (Asymptotic stability of ES under gradient flows) Any solution trajectory to (11) starting in a vicinity V of an ESx, for which (1) holds, will converge to that pointx.
Proof. Recall the so-called Moreau decomposition (see Aubin and Cellina 1984, Proposition 0.6.3), saying that any vector g ∈ E can be uniquely (and orthogonally) decomposed as a sum g = t +n where t ∈ T x is tangent and n is normal (orthogonal) to X at the current point x. Orthogonality means that hx 0 − x, ni ≤ 0, ∀x 0 ∈ X. As a result, P T x [g] = t = g − n, and any solution t 7 → x(t) to (11) makes the map t 7 → Λ(t) := 1 2 kx(t) −xk 2 Ljapunov. Indeed, omitting reference to time t, that map satisfieṡ
Using the continuity of π this shows that Λ(t) & 0, whence x(t) →x. 2
This result is not entirely novel. The instance when π is linear in its first variable, and X equals the standard simplex, appears in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) as Theorem 9.6.1. Those authors also use more general gradients, derived from a local x-dependent inner product on the tangent space to X at x. Doing so offers a double bonus: first, one may accommodate nonconvex manifolds X; second, the class of dynamics is much enlarged. In particular, applying the Shahshahani inner product on the interior of the simplex, the replicator equation comes out as gradient dynamics; see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, Theorem 24.3). Interesting in this regard are the results of Hopkins (1999) that replicator-like dynamics may emerge when fictitious play is aggregated over a heterogenous population.
We end this section by briefly considering use of discrete time in (11) . For that purpose we must first inquire about the nature of steady states:
Proposition 5. (Characterization of steady states)x is a rest point for (11), i.e., 0 ∈ P Tx [∂π(·,x)(x)] if x ∈ P X [x + sḡ] for someḡ ∈ ∂π(·,x)(x) and all s > 0.
This happens iff for someḡ ∈ ∂π(·,x)(x) the following variational inequality holds:
Finally, when π(·, ·) is concave in the first variable,x is a steady state iff it satisfies (3).
Proof. Letḡ ∈ ∂π(·,x)(x) satisfy (13). Then 0 = lim s&0 { P X [x + sḡ] −x} /s = P Tx [ḡ] , this being a general result of Zarantonello (1971) . (13) says that
and (14) is the associated (necessary and sufficient) optimality condition. (3) follows from standard convex analysis (Rockafellar 1970 ). 2 We now cast (11) into the following, more realistic, discrete-time process: Iteratively, at stages k = 0, 1, . . . let
the initial point x 0 ∈ X being arbitrary or accidental. Here g k ∈ ∂π(·, x k )(x k ) is a partial gradient of π(·, ·) with respect to the first variable at (x k , x k ). The positive sequence (s k ) ∞ k=0 of step sizes is chosen a priory subject to lim k→∞ s k = 0 and P ∞ k=0 s k = +∞. Evidently, (15) is a dynamic version of the fixed point condition (13) . In the particular setting (2) system (12) assumes the form
where
) is agent i's marginal payoff. Game theoretic studies of (12) or (16) include Ermoliev and Uryasiev (1982) , , Rosen (1965) .
Theorem 2. (Convergence to ES)
Suppose the partial gradient g ∈ ∂π(·, x)(x) is unique and depends continuously on x ∈ X. Also suppose that (1) holds for some ESx and vicinity V. Then, if the sequence (x k ) generated by (15) is bounded and enters infinitely often into V, we have x k →x.
Proof. It is known from Zarantonello (1971) that for any vector x ∈ X, and direction g we have lim s&0
where o(s) denotes a vector satisfying
This means that (15) can be rewritten on the format
Recall that by assumption the continuous vector fieldẋ = h(x) has unique solutions. The conclusion now follows from Proposition 3.1 in Benaim (1996) . 2
In the interest of a more global statement than Theorem 2 we introduce some additional notions, these presuming that solutions t 7 → x(t) to (11) be extended to all t ∈ R. The alfa and omega limit of an initial point ξ ∈ X, denoted α(ξ) and ω(ξ), equals the set of all accumulation points of the solution trajectory x(t), starting in ξ, when t tends to −∞ and +∞, respectively. We say that (11) yields simple dynamics if both α(ξ) and ω(ξ) are rest points for every ξ ∈ X.
A rest point e 1 of (11) is said to go to another rest point e 2 via a connecting orbit O if for some ξ ∈ O we have e 1 = α(ξ) and e 2 = ω(ξ). A cycle is a finite set of such points e 1 , . . . , e n , (e n+1 = e 1 ) together with orbits O 1 , . . . , O n such that O k connects e k to e k+1 . Now invoking Corollary 3.7 in Benaim (1996) we get:
Theorem 3. (Convergence to a discrete limit set) Assume that (11) has isolated rest points, simple dynamics and no cycle. Then a bounded sequence (x k ) generated by (15) converges toward a steady state. 2 A finite collection of Nash equilibria is generic in games. For such instances it remains a challenge to explore whether the dynamic (16) is simple with no cycles.
Examples
To illustrate and justify the concept ES, introduced above, this section offers several examples. The first four are concerned with noncooperative games, Example 4 being of main importance. Example 1. (Two-person, zero-sum games) Let there be merely two players i ∈ I := {+1, −1} . When individual i selects his strategy x i ∈ X i , he derives continuous payoff π i (x i , x −i ) which is concave in own choice x i . Suppose payoffs sum to zero and define π : X × X → R by
Thenx = (x 1 ,x −1 ) is Nash equilibrium iff (3) holds, or equivalently, iffx is a max-min saddle point of π 1 . When π 1 is affine in its second variable, a pointx will be ES in the sense of (4) if it is a strict Nash equilibrium, i.e., if
Example 2. (Two-person, finite-strategy, symmetric games) Consider a two-person, symmetric game with a finite set S of pure strategies. Denote then by X := ∆(S) the simplex consisting of all probability measures x := (x(s)) s∈S on S. The payoff π(x, x 0 ) to a player who uses the mixed strategy x ∈ X in front of his rival's choice x 0 ∈ X, is given in terms of an already specified function π : S ×S → R by its bilinear extension π(x,
. The interpretation of (4) goes in terms of random pair-wise matching of players from a single population. Equilibriumx is then seen as standard, common behavior prior to the appearance of a "mutation " x 6 =x. Specifically, one envisages that a population percentage ε starts to employ a new strategy x. Biological intuition behind (4) says that incumbent individuals, maintaining their pre-entry choicex, fare better against the post-entry population mix x ε = (1 − ε)x + εx, 0 < ε ≤ ε(x), than does any entering mutant x 6 =x. Naturally, in this example symmetric equilibria are of particular interest. We emphasize, however, that the more general definition (1) makes no hypothesis about symmetry.
Besides (1) and (4) there is a third equivalent characterization, due to Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund (1979): Proposition 6. (Local superiority of ESS)x is ES of a two-person, finite-strategy, symmetric game iff it is locally superior. 2 Example 3. (Two-person, two-strategy, symmetric games) This example continues and specializes the preceding one. Consider a two-person, two-strategy, symmetric game where player i = ±1 assigns probability x i to his first (either upper row or left column) action. The 2 × 2 payoff matrix may, without loss of generality, be assumed diagonal with entries a 1 , a 2 . Thus (16) reads
A well studied setting accommodates one homogeneous population of players. The initial point then naturally lies on the diagonal, and instead of (19) we could just as well have used the one-dimensional system
. A more general scenario admits two populations, starting maybe at different levels and moving in the state space [0, 1] 2 . In any case, assuming a 1 a 2 6 = 0, there are three cases to consider: First, when a 1 a 2 < 0, a Prisoner's Dilemma emerges with one strict equilibrium whence ES. Second, when both a 1 and a 2 are positive, a Coordination Game comes on stage, having three Nash equilibria, all symmetric. The two pure ones are ES whereas the mixed one x i = a 2 / (a 1 + a 2 ) is not. Third, if both a 1 and a 2 are negative, we get an antagonistic Hawk-Dove Game, having two strict, pure, asymmetric Nash equilibria and a symmetric, mixed one x i = a 2 /(a 1 + a 2 ). Given merely one population, the mixed equilibrium is the only ES. Present two populations, that equilibrium is no longer ES.
Example 4. (Noncooperative games in strategic form) Extending the preceding examples we now come to the setting which provided our principal motivation. Let the set I of noncooperative players be finite and have at least two members. Inequality (4) applied to (2) yields the following condition, introduced by Taylor (1979) :
To insist on local superiority certainly shrinks the class of fitting games. (There are games for which no ES strategy exists; see Weibull (1996, page 39) . Nonetheless, these conditions hold more often than might first be believed. Included are the instances for which (2) is concave-convex -as brought out by Proposition 4. As one example we advocate games with bilinear interaction: Proposition 7. (Games with bilinear interaction have ES equilibria) Suppose each individual i ∈ I has a utility function of the form
U i being concave, twice differentiable, and A ij a dimx i ×dimx j matrix. If the grand matrix, featuring A ij in block entry ij and ∇ 2 U i (x i ) in diagonal block entry ii, is negative semi-definite, then the game is concave-convex in the sense of (7) and (8). When moreover, the said block matrix is negative definite, the strict convexity condition (9) holds, and every Nash equilibrium is ES.
Proof. (2) assumes the form
Evidently, this π is concave in its first variable x, and (strict) convexity in its second variable x 0 obtains by the fact that ∇ 2 π(x, ·) is negative semi-definite (definite). 2
The setting of Proposition 7 does not imply uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: Consider a concave single-agent optimization problem with linear constraints. The set of saddle points need then not reduce to a singleton.
The last result was stated in a global fashion, appropriate, for example, in Cournot type oligopolies with affine inverse demand and strictly convex production costs. More generally, we believe that bilinear, local approximation around equilibrium often satisfies the curvature assumptions mentioned in Proposition 7.
Example 5. (Single-agent optimization, concave programming) In the simple situation of a single decision maker, say Robinson Crusoe, isolated from the intricacies of strategic interaction, let Π : X → R be his payoff function and define π(x, x 0 ) := Π(x). If Π is strictly concave and super-differentiable on X, then evidently,x ∈ X is ES if x = arg max Π. More generally, suppose Π is twice continuously differentiable with negative definite Hessian ∂ 2 ∂x 2 Π at every local maximum. Thenx ∈ X will be ES iff it is a strict local maximum. So, in view of the important instance (2) assume here that π(x, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X. Then, (3) is called a (primal) equilibrium problem. Associated to the latter is a dual equilibrium problem: namely, to findx ∈ X such that π(x, x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. Denote by X P , X D the two corresponding solution sets. One declares π monotone if π(x, x 0 ) + π(x 0 , x) ≥ 0 for all pairs x, x 0 ∈ X -and pseudo-monotone if π(x, x 0 ) ≤ 0 ⇒ π(x 0 , x) ≥ 0. Pseudo-monotonicity straightforwardly implies X P ⊆ X D . If π(x, ·) is lower semicontinuous from the right along any ray, and π(·, x) is strictly quasiconcave, then X D ⊆ X P ; see Bianchi and Schaible (1996) . Note that a solutionx to (3) becomes locally superior under strict local pseudo-monotonicity, that is, when π(x,x) ≤ 0 ⇒ π(x, x) > 0, ∀x ∈ V Âx. (2000)) Let the vector x record prices of various goods, produced and/or consumed by price-taking (competitive) economic agents. Those agents presumably generate (single-valued, continuous, 0-homogeneous) excess demand E(x). By Walras law x · E(x) = 0. Define here π(x, x 0 ) := x · E(x 0 ) and choose X as a suitable part of the non-negative orthant. For example, let X equal the standard unit simplex. Then, if (3) holds, or equivalently, if E(x) ≤ 0, we callx a (free disposal) equilibrium. The first inequality in (1) holds trivially, andx becomes locally superior if excess demand generated by x ∈ V Âx is too costly underx, i.e., ifx·E(x) > 0. Process (11) amounts to the classical Walrasian tâtonnement.
Example 9. (Malthusian dynamics) When π(x, x 0 ) := x · F (x 0 ) for some continuous mapping F : X → E, the concavity requirement in (1) has no bite. Friedman (1991) discusses such instances when X is the finite product of standard simplices X i ⊂ E i , i ∈ I. Let then D i (x i ) be the diagonal matrix formed by x i ∈ X i and set where 1 i := (1, 1, . .) has appropriate dimension. Since the force F i (x) so defined belongs to the tangent cone of X i at x i , the dynamics (11) simplify to a coupled set of replicators:ẋ i = F i (x), i ∈ I, called Malthusian by Friedman (op. cit.). Local superiority means here that
for all x ∈ XÂx sufficiently nearx. For frequency-dependent stability of two interacting species condition (20) has been studied in more general form by Cressman (1992 Cressman ( , 1996 .
